What do a doctor with a framed medical school degree on his clinic wall and a peacock with tall, bright feathers have in common? Answer: Expensive plumage. To be more specific, they’ve both got expensive plumage that sends signals, or messages, to potential patients or mates that they are reliable, trustworthy and safe.
In the case of the doctor, the framed degree sends a signal to a patient that a lot of sweat, tuition money and all-nighters went toward earning the credentials to practice medicine. The patient spying the Johns Hopkins medical degree while nervously sitting on the butcher paper receives the comforting signal: I can trust this person to stick the needle in the right place, because they don’t hand out degrees like that to anyone on the street.
University of Washington biologist Carl T. Bergstrom explains the similar function of the peacock’s plumage:
Because the peahens cannot judge a male's genetic quality directly, they instead attend to signals that the males provide: peacocks advertise their quality via bright plumage and a long flamboyant tail. This advertisement is a handicap in the sense that it is energetically costly to produce and maintain, and it is possibly dangerously conspicuous as well …
In contrast, “a weak and sickly male can scarcely afford to divert energetic resources from basic upkeep to the production of ornaments.”
The concept of honest signaling has been around in the field of biology for a long time. In 1973, Stanford professor of economics Michael Spence applied signaling theory to economics, earning a Nobel Prize in the process.
Spence’s classic example of economic signaling involves the role of education in the job market. Consider two applicants to the same job, where applicant A is more qualified than applicant B. Without any signals, there’s no way for an employer to know which applicant is better. This situation benefits applicant B greatly.
What if, however, applicant A could point to a fancy degree in a related field? It would send a signal to an employer that she invested time and effort into a signal. And maybe the degree in itself doesn’t make her a more productive worker. (The peacock’s plumage doesn’t necessarily make him a better peacock—in fact, the plumage can be quite cumbersome.) But the fact that applicant A has the extra energy to invest in an expensive signal is signal enough.
Like the sickly peacock, applicant B doesn’t have the wherewithal to invest in the signal. And that’s the key—it’s more expensive for the bad applicant to get the plumage, so they don’t bother getting it.
Applicant A, with the shiny plumage, gets the job.
The question for you, insurance professional, is what (honest) signals can you send to your clients to assure them that you’re a good bet? If you’re licensed to sell insurance, you’ve already invested in an expensive signal, so you’d do well to show it off.
Keep in mind that signals must be somewhat expensive to work. If the sickly peacock could afford expensive plumage, it would no longer be an effective signal. Similarly, sending an effective signal is more than buying a spendy three-piece suit. The suit may set you back a week’s pay, but it’s still a cheap signal to a prospect.
Many people underestimate the value of signals because they may not make them better at their jobs. But they miss the point. The degree doesn’t make applicant A more productive. It does, however, show the employer that they were able-bodied or able-minded enough to get it. And that’s what the employer is looking for. That's what your prospect is looking for.